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Japanese-Style Worker Participation
and United States Labor Law
William S. Rutchow*

I. INTRODUCTION

Foreign corporations, particularly Japanese, investing directly in the United
States' have imported a style of labor-management relations which emphasizes
worker participation in the management of the organization. 2 American corporations faced with competition from more efficient foreign enterprises have also
adopted worker-participation programs to increase efficiency and productivity.3
In the past, employer attempts to initiate employee participation programs in
the U.S. have run afoul of § 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). 4 Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA makes employer domination of or interference with an employee labor organization an unfair labor practice, 5 and the
courts and the National Labor Relations Board (Board) have generally viewed
employee participation plans as labor organizations improperly dominated by
employers. 6 The recent corporate enthusiasm for worker participation programs
has, however, led the Board and some courts to reexamine their criteria for
finding a violation of § 8(a)(2).7
This note will evaluate the current legal status of Japanese-style worker participation programs under the NLRA. First, it analyzes relevant sections of the
NLRA and their interpretation by the Board and the courts. Second, the note
describes various types of Japanese worker participation programs, and suggests
* Member of the class of 1988, University of Michigan Law School.
1. Japanese direct investment in the United States in 1986 was in the neighborhood of $27 billion.
Powell, Where the Jobs Are, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 2, 1987, at 42.
2. Consider, for example, the 1987 slogan of Honda of America Mfg., Inc.: "With increased
associate involvement, we improve quality, reduce cost and secure our future." (workers are called
"associates" at Honda). Publication of Corporate Communications Department of Honda of America
Mfg., Inc., 24000 U.S. Route 33, Marysville, OH 43040.
3. See generally Guest, Quality of Work Life-Learning From Tarrytown, HARv. Bus. REv. JulyAug. 1979, at 76.
4. See generally, e.g., NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959); Lawson Co. v. NLRB,
118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2505 (6th Cir. 1985).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982).
6. See, e.g., Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. 203.
7. See, e.g., Modem Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967).
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how these programs can be legally implemented under current American labor
law. Third, the note considers standards the Supreme Court may adopt to test the
legality of worker participation programs in the future. Finally, this note recommends that the Supreme Court uphold those participation programs which are
freely chosen by employees.
II. UNITED STATES LABOR LAW

A. The National Labor Relations Act
Any discussion of the constraints imposed by U.S. law on Japanese-style
management practices should begin with the National Labor Relations Act. Sections 1, 2(5), 7, and 8(a)(2) of the NLRA s dictate the opportunities for, and the
restrictions on, the establishment of any novel labor-management programs.
The NLRA's statement of purpose declares that U.S. policy encourages collective bargaining and protects "the exercise by workers of full freedom of association .. for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection." 9
Congress regarded the infamous "company union" as a major obstacle to this
goal of full freedom of association. 10 In response to the massive union movement
that occurred in the United States in the first third of the twentieth century,
employers in the 1930's formed company-sponsored unions. These company
unions, or employee committees, allowed employers to avoid forced bargaining
with the rapidly expanding independent unions." In passing a law which guaranteed the right of employees to organize freely and to bargain collectively, 2 it

8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152(5), 157,158(a)(2) (1982).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
10. An indication of Congressional intent can be found in the statements of the NLRA's sponsor,
Senator Wagner: "The greatest obstacles to collective bargaining are employer-dominated unions....
[T~he very first step toward genuine collective bargaining is the abolition of the employer-dominated
union as an agency for dealing with grievances, labor disputes, wages, rules, or hours of employment." 78 CoNo. REc. 3443 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
11.
See generally Kohler, Models of Worker Participation:The Uncertain Significance of Section
8(a)(2), 27 B.C.L. REv. 499, 518-532 (1986); A. Cox, D. BOK, & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 197-200 (10th ed. 1986). These company unions were often a sincere attempt
to give workers their first opportunity to be involved in the structuring of their working conditions.
Nevertheless, management control of these "unions" was almost total. The employer initiated the
committee, wrote the by-laws, drafted the constitution, called the meetings, provided all facilities and
funds, ran the meetings, and sometimes even appointed the employee members of the committees.
Even if the committee had a secret election of employee representatives, it was relatively easy for an
employer to control the selection process through criteria for eligibility such as age and length of
service restrictions.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
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hardly seemed consistent to allow company unions to remain in existence.13
Section 8(a)(2) therefore makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to:
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization
or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That subject to rules and
regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to section 156 of this title, an
employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees
to confer with him
4
during working hours without loss of time or pay.1
Section 8(a)(2) outlaws employer domination of a "labor organization." Section 2(5) defines a labor organization as:
any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee
or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole
or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages,
rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.' 5
Thus, a legally acceptable worker participation plan must not constitute a labor
organization, as defined by § 2(5), or, if the plan does constitute a labor organization, then it must not be dominated by an employer, as forbidden by § 8(a)(2).

B. JudicialApplication of NLRA to Employee Organizations
The sections of the NLRA addressing employee organizations have a checkered interpretive history in U.S. courts.' 6 The NLRA, as previously described,
encourages collective bargaining, 7 but it also protects the "exercise by workers
of full freedom of association."s These dual purposes have contributed to tension among the cases construing §§ 2(5) and 8(a)(2). Some courts have encouraged collective bargaining by interpreting these sections strictly to find that
almost any employee organization formed outside of the formal collective bargaining arena violates the NLRA.19 Courts upholding some types of employee
organizations have, conversely, stressed employee free choice and free associa-

13. For an example of the attitude of some members of Congress toward company unions at the
time of the passage of the NLRA, see S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1935).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982) (emphasis in original).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982); An employee's full freedom of association was further clarified in a
1947 amendment of § 7 of the NLRA. Employees were given the explicit right to refrainfrom joining
a labor organization (such as an outside union). "Employees shall have the right... to form, join, or
assist labor organizations . . . and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities." Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 140 (1947) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1982)) (emphasis added).
16. Compare NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959) with NLRB v. Streamway Div. of
Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584 (1941); NLRB v. Reed Rolled Thread Die
Co., 432 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Grand Foundries Inc., 362 F2d 702, 709 (8th Cir. 1966).
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tion and have de-emphasized the promotion of collective bargaining. 20 In fact,
this goal of employee free choice underlies virtually every judicial decision
allowing employee organizations to withstand scrutiny under either § 2(5)21 or
§ 8(a)(2).22

1. Interpretationof § 2(5)
The Supreme Court made its only major statement concerning employee participation plans nearly thirty years ago in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co. 23 In Cabot
Carbon, the employer had organized several "employee committees" to meet on
a regular basis with management to discuss problems of mutual interest, including the handling of grievances at the company's nonunion plants.2 4 The outcome
of the case depended on whether these employee committees were labor organizations, as defined by § 2(5), and were therefore subject to the restrictions
imposed by § 8(a)(2). In deciding that the committees were indeed labor organizations under § 2(5), the Court interpreted the phrase "dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment,
or conditions of work"' 25 to mean more than to bargain collectively. 26 The Court
found that the stated purpose and actual practice of the committees in handling
grievances made it "as plain as words can express" that these committees dealt
with management concerning grievances and that this alone brought the committees "squarely within the statutory definition of 'labor organizations'. "27 The
20. See, e.g., Scott & Fetzer, 691 F.2d 288; Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F2d 165
(7th Cir. 1955).
21. See, e.g., Scott & Fetzer, 691 F.2d at 293.
22. See, e.g., Chicago Rawhide, 221 F2d 165.
23. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
24. Id. at 205.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982) (emphasis added).
26. The Court, interpreting the legislative history of the NLRA as authorizing a broad meaning of
the term "dealing," stated:
The legislative history of § 2(5) strongly confirms that Congress did not understand or intend
[dealing with and bargaining with] to be synonymous. When the original print of the 1935
Wagner bill ... was being considered in the Senate, the then Secretary of Labor proposed an
amendment to § 2(5). . . . The proposal was that the term "bargaining collectively" be
substituted for the term "dealing." But the proposal was not adopted. It is therefore quite clear
that Congress, by adopting the broad term "dealing" and rejecting the more limited term
"bargaining collectively," did not intend that the broad term "dealing with" should be limited
to and mean only "bargaining with" as held by the Court of Appeals.
Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 211 (footnotes omitted). The Court was discussing the Hearing Before
Senate Committee on Education and Labor on S.1958 (Wagner Act), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67,
reprintedin 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr 1442-1443
(1935); S.1958, (2d print) 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 2 LEGs. HIsT. 2287 (1935) (text of
Wagner Act) (The Wagner Act was the original version of the NLRA).
27. Proposals by the committees respecting such matters as seniority, sick leave and wage corrections also supported the Court's finding that the committees were labor organizations. Cabot Carbon,
360 U.S. at 213.
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Supreme Court, in this case, encouraged the collective bargaining goal of the
NLRA by construing § 2(5) to find that any employee committee in contact with
the employer outside of the formal collective bargaining process was a "labor
organization" and therefore subject to the restrictions of § 8(a)(2).
The lower courts and the Board have generally followed the Supreme Court's
decision in Cabot Carbon by interpreting the phrase "dealing with," in § 2(5),
very broadly. The term "dealing" has usually been defined by the courts as
including almost every type of employer/employee communication. 28 Recently,
however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted a more narrow definition
of "dealing." In NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co.,29 the Sixth
Circuit, while agreeing with Cabot Carbon that "dealing" did mean more than
collective bargaining, concluded that the term had not been clearly defined by the
Cabot Carbon court. The Court of Appeals decided that "dealing" could not be
defined so as to include all attempts at employer/employee communication.30 The
court differentiated between a labor organization dealing with the employer and3
an employee representation committee communicating with the employer. '
Since the disputed employee representation committee in Scott & Fetzer merely
communicated with the employer, the court concluded that it was not a labor
organization under § 2(5).
The Sixth Circuit in Scott & Fetzer, calling the adversarial model of labor
relations an anachronism, 32 purported to adopt an interpretation of the NLRA that
would encourage cooperative labor/management relations. Although the Court of
Appeals considered several factors before concluding that the employee committees in Scott & Fetzer only communicated with the employer, 33 the court appar-

28. See, e.g., NLRB v. Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 458 E2d 414 (3d Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Ampex Corp.,
442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); Texas Bus Lines, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B.
No. 75, 120 L.R.R.M. 1304 (1985).
29. 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
30. "Whatever the reach of Cabot Carbon beyond the facts of that case, we do not think it applies
here. We cannot accept the Board's suggestion that Cabot Carbon should be read so broadly as to call
any group discussing issues related to employment a labor organization." Scott & Fetzer, 691 F.2d at
294.
31. "Although we acknowledge that the difference between communication of ideas and a course of
dealings at times is seemingly indistinct, we believe, nevertheless, that it is vital here." Scott &
Fetzer, 691 F.2d at 294.
32. Scott & Fetzer, 691 F2d at 293. The Sixth Circuit first indicated that the adversarial model was
an anachronism in Modern Plastics, 379 F2d 201. The U.S. Supreme Court viewed the NLRA as
promoting this adversarial model of labor relations at the time Cabot Carbon was decided. See NLRB
v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1959).
33. The factors the court looked to included: (1) the continuous rotation of committee members to
insure that most employees participated and were thereby speaking directly and individually to
management; (2) a finding by the Administrative Law Judge (AU) that there was no employer
hostility or anti-union animus; and (3) neither the employees nor an outside union involved in two
certification elections ever regarded the committees as anything even remotely resembling a labor
organization dealing with management. Scott & Fetzer, 691 F2d 294-95.
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ently upheld the representation committees because they promoted cooperative
labor/management relations 34 and employee free choice. 35 Protection of freedom
of choice for employees replaced the promotion of collective bargaining as the
overriding consideration of the Sixth Circuit in Scott & Fetzer.3 6 The Sixth
Circuit concluded that if employee free choice in organizational matters is not
impaired, then a particular employee representation committee will not be found
to have "dealt with" the employer and will not constitute a § 2(5) labor
organization.

37

The Board has also found that certain employee organizations do not constitute
"labor organizations" under § 2(5). In General Foods Corp.," the Board, in
adopting the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), dismissed an
unfair labor charge against an employee production team system at a General
Foods plant. The decision avoided a direct conflict with Cabot Carbon by focusing on the participatory or representational nature of the production teams instead
of the definition of "dealing." The AU concluded that in no Board case had a
team program been found to constitute a labor organization when the teams
included the entire labor force, a "committee of the whole." In General Foods,
the entire work force was divided into four teams. There was no representative
spokesman at team meetings, and all employees could participate as fully or as
little as they desired. These qualities showed that the teams were participatory,
not representational. 39 The ALJ and the Board also concluded that the employee
production teams were not § 2(5) labor organizations because the teams lacked
34. As evidence of this policy, consider that, in overruling the Board, the Court of Appeals
concluded that to permit the Board to disrupt the employee committee without substantial evidence of
domination would frustrate the purpose of the NLRA. See Scott & Fetzer, 691 F.2d at 292-293.
35. The Sixth Circuit had moved toward a test of actual infringement of employee free choice in
two cases in which committees that were found to be labor organizations were found not to be
illegally dominated under § 8(a)(2). See Federal-Mogul Corp., Coldwater Distrib. Center Div. v.
NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 1968); Modem Plastics v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir.
1967). The court in Scott & Fetzer stated that Modern Plasticsand Federal-Mogul "indicate ... that
[the Sixth] circuit is willing to reject a rigid interpretation of the [NLRA] and instead consider
whether the employer's behavior fosters employee free expression and choice as the Act requires."
Scott & Fetzer, 691 F2d at 293. For a detailed discussion of the domination issue, see infra text
accompanying notes 42-56.
36. The court held that:
There has been no evidence of Company hostility toward the union and no evidence that the
Company itself interfered with any exercise of employee rights to bargain collectively, unless
it might be said that an enlightened personnel policy led them to be content with the status
quo. This was their choice. We see no reason under the Act to disturb that choice or to tip the
scales against it and in favor of [an outside union] which the employees themselves have twice
rejected.
Scott & Fetzer, 691 F.2d at 295 (emphasis added).
37. See Scott & Fetzer, 691 F2d at 295.
38. 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1232 (1977).
39. See id. at 1234-35.

WORKER PARTICIPATION

217

the normal features of a labor organization, such as a constitution, bylaws, and
officers, and because the teams had not been created to forestall the organization
of an independent union but were established to organize the work load within
the facility 0
Under the theories described in this section, the courts and the Board have
found certain worker participation programs to be outside the definition of a labor
organization given in § 2(5) and, therefore, beyond the coverage of § 8(a)(2) of
the NLRA. The majority of courts approving worker participation programs have
not, however, relied on § 2(5); instead, these courts have accepted that the
challenged worker participation programs were labor organizations but have held
that the organizations did not violate § 8(a)(2) because they were not dominated
by the employer.
2. Interpretationof § 8(a)(2)
The first major case allowing a worker participation program to survive scru41
tiny under § 8(a)(2) was Chicago Rawhide ManufacturingCompany v NLRB.
Nearly all cases permitting worker participation programs since Chicago
Rawhide have followed its basic reasoning. The case involved a Grievance Committee and an Employees Shop Committee established under a plan created by
the employer and the employees. 42 An outside union, which had lost a representation election, brought an unfair labor practice charge complaining that the
company had unlawfully supported the employee committees in violation of
§ 8(a)(2). The Seventh Circuit held that the company's cooperation in permitting
employees to meet during working hours to explain the grievance plan, in allowing election of committee representatives on company premises, and in providing
other minor forms of assistance did not support an unfair labor charge.4 3 The
court drew a distinction between illegal support of a labor organization and
cooperation with such an organization. Illegal support included "at least some
degree of control or influence,"44 while employer cooperation only "assists the

40. In General Foods, dealing is mentioned, but the AU decided that what management functions
the employees were responsible for were completely delegated from management to the workers and,
therefore, the teams were not dealing with management. Id. at 1234-35. Recently, the Sixth Circuit
adopted a representational/participatory distinction in 2(5) cases by upholding an unfair labor practice

charge where an employee committee formed by the employer was representational in nature and
anti-union animus was present. Lawson Co. v. NLRB, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2505, 2509 (6th Cir.
1985).
41. 221 F2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).

42. There was no disagreement among the parties that these committees were indeed § 2(5) labor
organizations. The committees handled grievances, discussed wages and generally acted as the
bargaining agent for the employees; in fact, the employees eventually petitioned the NLRB to

recognize the committees as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees. Chicago
Rawhide, 221 E2d at 166-67.

43. Id. at 170.
44. id. at 167.
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employees . . . in carrying out their independent intention[s]. ' ' 45 Without this
distinction between support and cooperation, employers would face accusations
of unlawful domination for any attempt to cooperate with their employees, and
such accusations would frustrate the NLRA's principal purpose of encouraging
"cooperation between management and labor."'
In permitting limited employer involvement with employee organizations, the
Seventh Circuit in Chicago Rawhide adopted a flexible interpretation of employee free will and association. Evidence of actual control of the employee
organization by the employer, not just the potential for employer control or
domination, became necessary, after Chicago Rawhide, to prove a violation of
§ 8(a)(2). Employer cooperation aiding an employee organization, but not inter47
fering with the free choice of workers, is allowed.
Several factors that courts since Chicago Rawhide have examined when considering alleged violations of § 8(a)(2) include: (1) anti-union animus of the
employer; (2) whether the employee organization was formed during an organizational drive by an outside union; (3) whether the employer or employees
initiated the organization; (4) employee satisfaction with the organization; (5)
employee support for the formation of the organization; (6) employer involvement in the organization's election process; (7) employer financial support for the
organization, such as clerical staff, office space, equipment, or paid time-off to
48
attend meetings; and (8) management control of the organization's meetings.
Courts approving employee participation programs analyze these factors and all
surrounding circumstances to determine, on a case by case basis, whether the
choice of employees, in establishing a particular employee organization, was free
49
from actual employer interference or coercion.
The approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in Chicago Rawhide, though
adopted by several other circuits, 0 has not been endorsed by the Board, which
continues to apply a strict standard toward employer cooperation with employee
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. "Assistance or cooperation does not always mean domination ... and the Board must prove
that employer assistance is actually creating company control over the union before it has established
a violation of Section 8(a)(2). 'The test of whether an employee organization is employer controlled is
not an objective one but rather subjective from the standpoint of the employees'." Id. at 168 (quoting
NLRB v. Sharpies Chemicals, Inc., 209 F.2d 645, 652 (6th Cir. 1954)).
48. See Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 293 (6th Cir. 1982); Hertzka &
Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975) (stating that
employee suggestion of committee was a material consideration); Schmidman & Keller, Employee
ParticipationPlans as Section 8(a)(2) Violations, 35 LAB. L.J. 772, 775-76 (1984).
49. See generally, e.g., NLRB v. Clegg, 304 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1962); ChicagoRawhide, 221 F2d
165.
50. See, e.g., NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979); Hertzka & Knowles v.
NLRB, 503 F2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975); NLRB v. Keller Ladders
Southern, Inc., 405 F2d 663, (5th Cir. 1968); Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915 (6th Cir.
1968); NLRB v. Clegg, 304 F2d 168 (8th Cir. 1962).
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organizations. While the Board examines factors similar to those scrutinized by
courts following the Chicago Rawhide approach, 5' the Board considers not only
actual control, but also the potential for employer control of the employees'
freedom of choice. Even if no actual domination of or interference with the
employee organization by the employer can be shown, the Board, and courts
following its strict approach, will find a violation of § 8(a)(2) if the potential for
52
such interference exists.
When worker participation programs have been upheld, the courts and the
Board have used two methods of statutory construction. In a minority of cases,
the courts and the Board have defined the parameters of a "labor organization"
under § 2(5) to limit the types of participation programs subject to attack under
§ 8(a)(2). By narrowing the broad interpretation of "dealing" from Cabot Carbon53 and by drawing a distinction between representational and participatory
organizations, 4 the Sixth Circuit and the Board have placed employee participation programs that do not impair the free choice of employees outside the reach of
the NLRA. The majority of cases upholding worker participation plans, however,
accept that the plans fall within the statutory definition of a labor organization,
but find that labor organizations characterized by employee free choice and
association are not dominated by the employer in violation of § 8(a)(2). 55 Thus,
whether the Board or the courts have utilized § 2(5) or 8(a)(2) in their analyses,
they have approved only those employee organizations freely chosen by the
employees.

I1.

JAPANESE-STYLE WORKER PARTICIPATION PROGRAMS

The Japanese have become prime exponents of the cooperation model of labor
relations. 56 The major difference between Japanese and U.S. labor relations is the
degree of cooperation between labor and management. Japanese companies investing in the United States face the challenge of inspiring cooperation and
employee loyalty, which are seen as cornerstones of Japanese productivity, in a
57
labor market with a long adversarial history between labor and management.

51. i.e. employer financial support of the organization, management control of the meetings, etc.
52. See, e.g., Spiegel Trucking Co., 225 N.L.R.B. 178, 92 L.R.R.M. 1604 (1976). The Second,
Third, and Tenth Circuits continue to follow the Board's approach, e.g., Fire Alert Co., 182
N.L.R.B. 910 (1970), enforced, NLRB v. Fire Alert Co., 65 Lab. Cas. (CCH) Para. 11,874 (10th Cir.
June 3, 1971); NLRB v. General Precision, Inc., 381 F2d 61 (3d Cir 1967); Irving Air Chute Co. v.
NLRB, 350 F2d 176 (2d Cir. 1965).
53. NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
54. General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977).
55. See supra notes 49-50.
56. W.B. GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 163 (1984).
57. The Japanese must prove that they can put an American face on their vaunted consensusmanagement style. Powell, supra note 1, at 44.
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This section discusses which management strategies could be used by a Japanese
corporation investing in the U.S. to inspire worker cooperation and loyalty.
In Japan the company union is the basis of the cooperative relationship between labor and management. 8 Today, company unions comprise over 90 percent of the labor unions in Japan,59 and many top corporate executives are former
union members. 6 There are differences between the U.S. company unions of the
1930's and the company unions of present-day Japan. Japanese company unions
were not designed to avoid unionization; they were the form that unionization
initially took in Japan. 6' Company unions in Japan, unlike U.S. company unions,
do retain a small measure of independence from the companies whose workers
they represent through their affiliation with loosely organized national federations. 62 Nevertheless, the significant similarities between contemporary Japanese
company unions and their early 20th century American counterparts make imple63
mentation of Japanese-style unions in the United States legally doubtful.
Japanese company unions owe their success to the paternalistic culture in
which they exist. In Japanese culture, the company has an obligation to protect
the interests of its workers. 64 This paternalistic approach of the typical Japanese
corporation conflicts with the American ideal of the individual 65 and makes the
Japanese company union an unlikely vehicle for fostering employee loyalty in the
66
U.S. assuming it could survive the legal hurdles of § 8(a)(2).
Other worker participation programs utilized by the Japanese to further cooperative labor/management relations may, however, be adaptable to a U.S. operation. The type of "Japanese" program most adaptable to a U.S. company is the
Quality Control Circle (QCC). 67 QCC's consist of small groups of employees

58. W.B. GOULD, supra note 56, at 3.

59. See W.B. GOULD, supra note 56, at 2.
60. W.B. GOULD, supra note 56, at 4.
61. See W.B. GOULD, supra note 56, at 17-18. These government mandated, company unions
were part of the basic reforms of the Japanese social order dictated by General MacArthur to help
develop democracy at the end of World War II.
62. W.B. GOULD, supra note 56, at 6-7.
63. Japanese company unions, though technically independent, are influenced to a large extent by
the employer, and the form of such unions (i.e., limited to one company as opposed to American
trade or industry-wide unions) appears to bring them within the prohibitions of § 8(a)(2). See
generally W.B. GOULD, supra note 56.

64. For example, the largest companies guarantee lifetime employment. W.B. GOULD, supra note
56, at 10-11.
65. The president of the Building and Construction 'Tades Department of the AFL-CIO, Robert
Georgine, mocks this paternalistic style: "'We'll tell you what's good for you, and you do everything
you can to make us successful.' That doesn't wash here." Powell, supra note 1, at 44.
66. Japanese company unions possess many of the characteristics, such as employer financial
support and management control of meetings, which even the most flexible courts have found to be
violations of § 8(a)(2). See supra text accompanying note 49.
67. Note, Participatory Management Under Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 83 MICH. L. Ruv. 1736, 1740 (1985).
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formed from existing departments. The employees meet regularly to suggest
improvements in product quality and production efficiency. 61 Members of management often attend circle meetings, but the meetings are run by the employees.
The recommendations made to management by these circles involve specific
production improvements. Bonuses are frequently awarded for employee suggestions that result in significant quality gains. 69 The groups usually operate
through voluntary input by each employee in the group. The groups rarely consider topics not related to their own specific work product.70 Although QCC's do
not give workers a voice in management decisions, members of such circles have
the opportunity to contribute to the structuring of the manufacturing process, 7 a
rarity for American workers.
The Japanese are not alone in developing innovative worker participation programs. Swedish corporations, among others, have implemented Japanese-style
worker participation programs. Specifically, Swedish automakers use "employee
production teams." 72 Employers initiate production teams by placing plant workers into relatively small teams that become responsible for an entire operation
within the plant. Acting by consensus, the team makes job assignments to team
members, assigns job rotations, resolves quality control problems, schedules
overtime, and interviews prospective employees.73 Usually the teams have no
disciplinary powers, although some teams do hear and resolve grievances. 74
The team concept, because it involves the rotation of job functions, relieves the
tedium associated with manufacturing jobs, improving worker morale and productivity. This job rotation is facilitated by the flexible structuring of job classifications often found in Japanese plants, which differs from the highly rigid and
departmentalized job classifications characteristic of American unionized
facilities.7 5
68. Honda of America utilizes QCC's known as NH (for "New Honda") circles. An NH circle
consists of five to ten members who voluntarily work together on an area of common concern to
suggest improvements in such areas as quality, safety, communications, working environment, and
efficiency. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., The Honda Way: An Innovative Approach to Management
and Production (available from the Corporate Communications Department of Honda of America
Mfg., Inc., 24000 U.S. Route 33, Marysville, OH 43040).
69. A week's expenses-paid trip to Japan was awarded to a circle at Honda of America.
70. See Kohler, supra note 11, at 506; Note, supra note 67, at 1740; see also Krause, Americans
Can Build Good Cars, 18 WAsH. MONTHLY, July-Aug. 1986, at 41, 43.
71. See Kohler, supra note 11,at 506.
72. See Note, supra note 67, at 1741.
73. See General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1233 (1977); Kohler, supra note 11, at 508.
74. Note, supra note 67, at 1741. Honda of America has a separate Associate Review Panel, made
up of employees, which reviews discharges at the plant and makes decisions as to whether an
employee is entitled to reinstatement. Telephone interview with Roger F. Lambert, ManagerCorporate Communications, Honda of America Mfg., Inc. (March 10, 1987).
75. The Honda of America facility at Marysville, Ohio, for example, has only two job classifications, compared with as many as 100 classifications in some American unionized plants, allowing
Honda associates the freedom to perform many different job functions. Koepp, Honda in a Hurry,
TIME, Sept. 8, 1986, at 49.
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Worker participation may also take the form of Quality of Work-life (QWL)
(or job enrichment) programs. QWL programs have been defined as:
A process for work organization which enables its members at all levels to actively
participate in shaping the organization's environment, methods, and outcomes.
This value-based process is aimed toward meeting the twin goals of enhanced
76
effectiveness of the [firm] and improved quality of life at work for employees.
This type of program involves a process of attitude reinforcement for individual
workers and is more flexible than either QCC's or production teams. A company's QWL program generally includes physical fitness programs, personal
enrichment seminars on topics such as stress management and interpersonal
communications, 77 joint labor/management safety or quality committees, QCC's,
and production teams. 78 QWL programs emphasize worker satisfaction and enrichment with the expectation that, as employee satisfaction with the working
79
environment increases, the quality and quantity of production will increase.
The emphasis on employee satisfaction directs the communication between management and employees toward the conditions of the working environment rather
than toward wages and hours or production and product quality.
The Japanese have experience with all of the worker participation programs
described above.80 Japanese corporations investing in the United States will likely
use one or more of these programs to improve the loyalty and productivity of
their U.S. labor force. 8 U.S. individualism, while at odds with the paternalistic
Japanese labor/management philosophy,82 does not preclude the successful implementation of these programs in the United States. The individual worker may
not be as important as the team or the circle, but the additional responsibilities
given to workers through QCC's and production teams can improve an individual's self-esteem and job satisfaction. This corporate emphasis on the worth of
the individual can, in turn, increase worker loyalty to the organization that fosters
these feelings of satisfaction and self-worth.83

76. Fulmer & Coleman, Do Quality-of-Work-Life Programs Violate Section 8(a)(2)?, 35 LAB. L.J.
675, 675 (1984) [hereinafter Fulmer] (quoting Wakin, Quality of Work Life: Labor's Love Found,
TODAY'S

OFF., July 1983, at 38).

77. Cf General Foods, 231 N.L.R.B. at 1235 (outside professional brought in to increase team
communication and trust levels).
78. See generally, e.g., Fulmer, supra note 76.
79. See Note, supra note 67, at 1741.
80. See generally Krause, supra note 70.
81. For example, Honda of America uses a form of the QCC called the NH circle. Honda of
America Mfg., Inc., supra note 68.
82. Asa Jonishi, senior director of Kyocera Corp., a Japanese high-tech company with facilities in
California, concedes that "[mlost Americans are very, very individualistic-you could almost say
egotistic; they are quite different from the way we would like our people to be." Powell, supra note 1,
at 44.
83. Consider the remarks of Shoichiro rimajiri, President of Honda of America Mfg., Inc.:
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WORKER PARTICIPATION PROGRAMS UNDER U.S. LABOR LAW

The major legal consideration confronting a corporation interested in implementing Japanese-style worker participation techniques involves the types of
programs the corporation can institute in the United States without violating the
NLRA.
What, specifically, constitutes a legal worker participation program under the
NLRA? One comprehensive statement can be made. If the only discernible
motive for implementing a QCC, employee-production team or other type of
worker participation program is to short-circuit an organizing drive by an independent labor union, the Board and the courts will define the program as a § 2(5)
labor organization improperly dominated by an employer in violation of
§ 8(a)(2). The anti-union animus shown by impeding an organizing drive constitutes the type of interference with employee free choice found impermissible
by even the most liberal judicial interpreters of §§ 2(5) and 8(a)(2).15 In other
situations, however, the legality of a worker participation program will often
depend upon jurisdiction.
Determining the legality of an employee production team, QCC, or QWL
program in any jurisdiction involves establishing whether the program constitutes
a § 2(5) labor organization and, if so, whether the employer dominates that
organization in violation of § 8(a)(2). The Board and the Sixth Circuit have both
parted from the Supreme Court's broad construction of § 2(5) in Cabot Carbon to
uphold the legality of worker participation programs. 8 6 According to the Board,87
employee production teams that embrace the entire labor force lack a crucial
element of a § 2(5) labor organization, namely representation. When all employees can particpate and talk directly to management without the intervention of a
[T]he Honda approach is to start with the individual Associate, with respect for that individual's intelligence, hard work and commitment....
Our whole approach to quality is based upon our respect for what the individual Associate
can achieve. We do not mandate quality by having quality inspectors at each step on the
manufacturing process. Instead we teach quality as a satisfying way of life and ask each
Associate to take responsibility for the quality of our products.
Speech by Shoichiro Irimajiri, Fifth Conference, U.S.-Japan Automotive Industry, "Entrepreneurship in a Mature Industry" (Mar. 5, 1985) (available from Honda of America Mfg., Inc.).
84. A violation of § 8(a)(2) of the NLRA by an employer would usually result in the filing of an
unfair labor practice against the employer. If the charge is sustained by the Board, the employer will
probably be ordered to disband the participation organization or withdraw the illegal support.
85. See Lawson Co. v. NLRB, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2505, 2509 (6th Cir. 1985).
86. See Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982); General Foods Corp.,
231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977).
87. See General Foods, 231 N.L.R.B. at 1234. Because the Board has allowed employee production teams to remain outside the scope of § 2(5) in General Foods, and since the Board is the first
body to consider an unfair labor practice charge, employers should know the characteristics that
employee production teams must possess to avoid classification by the Board as labor organizations.
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team leader or spokesperson, the organization is participatory and does not
constitute a § 2(5) (representational) labor organization. 8 8 If the General Foods
decision is followed by the Board in the future, the Board's position should
withstand review by the Courts of Appeals. Though many of the Courts of
Appeals simply assume that worker participation programs are labor organizations under § 2(5),89 because the courts are obligated to defer to decisions of the
Board,' approval of participatory employee organizations by the Board may
make the courts reluctant to label worker participation programs as § 2(5) labor
organizations.
Employee production teams are generally concerned with the delegation of
production responsibility and do not usually communicate with management. 9'
Normally, therefore, production teams will not be identified as labor organizations because, if there is no communication with management, there can be no
92
"dealing" with management, as required of a § 2(5) labor organization.
QCC's and QWL programs must be participatory and not representational as
well as possess other characteristics to avoid classification as labor organizations
under § 2(5). QCC's must be concerned with production quality and must not
consistently discuss grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of employment. Controlling the subject areas open to
recommendation by these circles is crucial. Dangers emerge when QCC's make
broad policy recommendations to management rather than product quality suggestions. When the subject matter of any employee participation program encompasses the traditional areas of employee representation such as grievances,
wages, and hours, it is likely that the program will be identified as a labor
organization. 93 Even occasional communication on these traditional matters constitutes "dealing" in all but one circuit, 94 and only a labor organization can
permissibly deal with management on such issues.
A QWL program risks classification as a labor organization when the program
includes a structured plan of feedback and communication between management
and employees on subjects related to traditional labor organization issues such as
grievances and wages. QWL programs, however, do not invariably involve broad

88. See General Foods, 231 N.L.R.B. at 1235.
89. See generally Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955) (the court's
analysis focused on § 8(a)(2) and simply accepted that the challenged committees were § 2(5) labor
organizations).
90. The Board is "one of those agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal
with a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the authority of an
expertness which courts do not possess and therefore must respect." Universal Camera Corp. v.

NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
91. See General Foods, 231 N.L.R.B. at 1235.
92. See Scott & Fetzer, 691 F2d at 293.
93. See NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 213 (1959).
94. That circuit being the Sixth Circuit. See Scott & Fetzer, 691 F2d at 294.

WORKER PARTICIPATION

225

programs of labor/management communication; for example, a QWL program
may simply involve health committees or worker exercise programs. 95
The effectiveness of worker participation programs largely depends upon management seriously considering the recommendations generated by the employee
organizations. But when the recommendations concern broad non-production
issues, implementation of the recommendations by management shows that the
organization effectively deals with management and therefore constitutes a § 2(5)
labor organization. 96 Ironically then, the more effectively a program fosters
communication between labor and management, the more probable its identification as a labor organization and the more vulnerable it becomes to accusations of
employer domination. 97 Because of the types of recommendations a company
wants generated by QWL and QCC programs, these participation plans will often
be classified as § 2(5) labor organizations, and thus the analysis must proceed to
the question of whether the employer dominates the worker participation program in violation of § 8(a)(2).
For QCC's, employer domination problems result from management initiation
of the circles, management selection of meeting times, management attendance
at meetings, and management's furnishing of facilities for the meetings. These
factors would probably establish a § 8(a)(2) violation for the Board or a circuit
court following the Board's strict standard toward employer assistance to employee organizations. 98 Circuit courts following Chicago Rawhide and using an
actual-domination-of-employee-free-choice standard would not be likely to invalidate a QCC if the employees were satisfied with the circle, if management did
not control the meetings, and if management did not allow these circles to
substitute for a labor organization.99 Courts employing the actual-domination
standard will consider whether the QCC is voluntary. When employees are not
pressured to join a QCC, but are free to participate if they wish, employee choice
is not controlled by the employer.
A QWL plan that includes suggestion committees and feedback to employees

95. Cf Fulmer, supra note 76, at 675-76.
96. See&F1 NLRB v. Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 458 F.2d 414, 419 (3d Cir. 1972) (employee committee
whose recommendations on sanitary conditions and inadequate ventilation were implemented by
management held to be a labor organization); But see Fulmer, supra note 76, at 682 (arguing that
recommendations funneled through QWL programs do not represent "dealing").
97. Cf Scott & Fetzer, 691 F 2d at 291 (stating that because the committee was expressly mandated
by the company and because the company controlled its meetings, if the employee committee was a
labor organization, there was "little question that ... [it] was dominated by the Company").
98. See Spiegel Trucking Co., 225 N.L.R.B. 178, 92 L.R.R.M. 1604 (1976).
99. See, e.g., Federal-Mogul Corp., Coldwater Distrib. Center Div. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 921
(6th Cir. 1968) (employee committee upheld due to lack of actual employer control even though
committee members compensated for time spent at meetings and employer financially supported the
committee). Disestablishment is the usual Board remedy for a labor organization illegally dominated
under § 8(a)(2).
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by management can face charges of employer control similar to those directed at
QCC programs. A finding of illegal support or control will generally depend
upon the jurisdiction.'t0 The potential for employer control in QWL programs
can be great, but actual control may vary widely on a case by case basis,
depending on the characteristics of the particular QWL program.' 0'
Though an employee production team is less likely than a QCC or QWL plan
to be regarded as a labor organization, if so classified it will probably be controlled by the employer in violation of 8(a)(2). The ability of management to
disband these teams may be an important consideration in showing employer
control over such teams. 0 2 For production teams, however, the major defense to
an 8(a)(2) charge remains an assertion that the team is not a 2(5) labor organization but merely a work crew to which management delegates responsibility but
with which it does not "deal."
Under current judicial interpretations of the NLRA, any type of employee
participation program that communicates worker input to management is likely to
constitute a labor organization dominated by the employer. But in jurisdictions
following the Chicago Rawhide actual-domination standard, a successful worker
participation program receiving cooperation and input from management will not
be disestablished under § 8(a)(2) merely because employer/employee communication has resulted in concrete cooperation between management and labor.
The legality of worker participation programs therefore continues to.depend on
the jurisdiction in which the program is challenged.
V. PoTENTIAL SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION

The rising number of Japanese-style worker participation programs in the
United States increases the pressure on the Supreme Court to resolve the conflict
among the circuit courts on the question of worker participation.0 3 There are
several possible alternatives available to the Supreme Court. First, the Court
could reaffirm its holding in Cabot Carbon and uphold the Board's strict reading
of § 8(a)(2) to forbid employer cooperation with and assistance to employee
organizations and virtually eliminate opportunities for labor/management relations outside the traditional collective bargaining arena. Second, the Court could
100. This jurisdictional distinction results from the split among circuits applying the actual domination standard and those circuits applying the potential domination standard. See supra notes 50, 52.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
102. See General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1235 (1977).
103. See W.B. GOULD, supra note 56, at 99 (commenting on U.S. decisions which view contact
between labor and management through participation programs as unlawful: "This view is anachronistic and should be disregarded by the Supreme Court when it next has the opportunity to consider
the matter."). But see Note, Collective Bargaining as an Industrial System: An Argument Against
JudicialRevision of Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1662,
1682 (1983) ("Ad hoc judgments by courts about whether employee free choice has been preservedmade without any legislative delineation of what this choice would mean-do not promote the current
legally established industrial relations system.").
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narrow the broad Cabot Carbon construction of § 2(5) by adopting the representational/participatory distinction of General Foods or the communication/dealing
distinction of Scott & Fetzer. A narrow interpretation of § 2(5) would place many
worker participation programs outside the definition of a labor organization and
would thus limit the programs subject to the restrictions of § 8(a)(2). Finally, the
Court could adopt the employee free choice/actual domination standard first
elaborated in Chicago Rawhide to allow, under § 8(a)(2), a case by case determination of employer interference with employee freedom of association and
actual employer domination of employee organizations.
When applying the NLRA to worker participation plans, the Supreme Court
should use a different analysis for employee production teams than for QCC's or
QWL plans. To establish the legality of employee production teams, the Court
should adopt, under § 2(5), a distinction between "dealing" with the employer
and something less than "dealing." A distinction between a § 2(5) labor organization that "deals" with the employer and a worker participation organization that
either communicates with the employer'04 or has its responsibilities delegated to
it by the employer'05 has substantial support in the language of § 2(5).106 In
practice, production teams have virtually all responsibility delegated to them by
management, and while the teams are usually controlled by the employer, they
seldom deal with management concerning "grievances, labor disputes, wages,
rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."1 7 Because production
teams are concerned primarily with the delegation of production responsibility,
and not "dealing" with management, the Supreme Court could find, without
distorting the plain language of § 2(5), that these teams generally are not labor
organizations and therefore are not subject to the restrictions of § 8(a)(2).10 8

104. See Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F2d 288, 294 (6th Cir. 1982). The distinction
in Scott & Fetzer is sound, though the reasoning is somewhat inconsistent. The court in Scott &
Fetzer transplanted a theory formulated to address the issue of domination of an employee's freedom
of association (in violation of § 8(a)(2)), and applied it to § 2(5). Section 2(5) merely defines a labor
organization with no mention of employer interference or domination. Employer domination or
interference is simply not a part of the definition of a labor organization. For example, an employee
organization dominated by the employer need not "deal" with the employer (i.e. a production team in
which all responsibility is delegated), while an employee organization that "deals" with the employer
may not be dominated by that employer (i.e. an independent union).
105. See General Foods, 231 N.L.R.B. at 1235.
106. Section 2(5) defines a labor organization, in part, as "any organization ... in which
employees participate and which exists for the purpose ... of dealing with employers." 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(5) (1982).
107. Id.
108. The Supreme Court could also adopt the distinction made by the Board in General Foods
between a representative employee organization and a participatory employee organization to uphold
participatory employee production teams. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court could find this distinction
untenable under the language of the NLRA. Section 2(5) defines a labor organization as "any
organization of any kind . . . in which employees participate," and makes no distinction between
participatory organizations and representative organizations. Id.
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When the Court examines the legality of QCC and QWL programs, it should
adopt a different analysis. An effective QCC or QWL program must involve
considerable communication between labor and management. These programs
will, therefore, often be regarded as labor organizations "dealing" with the
employer under § 2(5).109 Nevertheless, if a QCC or QWL program allows
unrestricted employee freedom of choice and association, then the Chicago
Rawhide actual domination test, developed by the Seventh Circuit under §
8(a)(2), can provide the Supreme Court with a workable standard to permit the
program to survive. If the Court is willing to consider all the circumstances
surrounding the implementation and operation of a challenged QCC or QWL
program on a case by case basis, then the Chicago Rawhide test should enable
the Court to determine, in each particular case, whether the employee organization has actually been dominated by the employer in violation of § 8(a)(2)." 0
Such an analysis will enable the Supreme Court to reach equitable decisions in
individual cases by upholding freely chosen programs and invalidating those
programs actually dominated by the employer. By adopting the standards developed by the circuit courts in Scott & Fetzer and Chicago Rawhide,"' the Supreme Court could interpret §§ 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the NLRA to uphold the
validity of all types of worker participation programs in a principled, yet practicable and flexible manner.
Additional support for a less rigid judicial approach to worker participation
plans can be found in the legislative history of the NLRA. During the consideration of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA," 2 the House of Representatives passed an amendment allowing employers to form employee
committees. "3 The Conference Committee rejected this amendment as unneces109. A QCC or QWL program will undoubtedly be regarded as a § 2(5) labor organization if it
discusses with the employer such issues as grievances, wages, hours, and working conditions. See
Lawson Co. v. NLRB, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2505, 2509 (6th Cir. 1985); NLRB v. Sharples Chemicals, 209 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1954) (employee committees afforded employees a means to secure
satisfaction for their grievances and improvement of their working conditions and therefore were labor
organizations).
110. See, e.g., NLRB v. Keller Ladders Southern, Inc., 405 F.2d 663, 667 (5th Cir. 1968) (citing
Chicago Rawhide in finding that cooperation that does not interfere with employee free choice is not
illegal).
Ill. The Supreme Court should also consider the standard developed by the Board. See General
Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977).
112. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
113. The amendment, § 8(d)(3), reads as follows:
8(d). Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the following shall not constitute
or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act:
3) Forming or maintaining by an employer of a committee of employees and discussing
with it matters of mutual interest, including grievances, wages, hours of employment, and
other working conditions, if the Board has not certified or the employer has not recognized
a representative as their representative under section 9.
H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1947), reprintedin 1NLRB,
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sary because the Committee interpreted the NLRA to permit employees to meet
with their employers outside of the collective bargaining arena." 4 Thus, the
legislative history surrounding the Taft-Hartley Amendments supports a more
flexible interpretation of the NLRA by the courts.
Several policy considerations may persuade the Supreme Court to reject its
holding in Cabot Carbon and allow worker participation programs in the future.
A strict interpretation of the NLRA could discourage Japanese direct investment
in the United States. Such investment, if encouraged, could effectively reduce
the U.S. trade deficit with Japan. "5 Hundreds of thousands of jobs have been and
will continue to be created by increased Japanese investment," 6 mostly in small
rural communities which the Japanese prefer and where the recent farm crisis has
left many Americans unemployed. In addition, these programs often represent a
sincere effort by the employer to decrease the hostility and mistrust that has long
characterized American labor relations." 7 The potential for management abuse of
worker participation programs is a very real concern. Nevertheless, adopting a
standard that synthesizes the Scott & Fetzer, General Foods, and Chicago
Rawhide approaches will allow the Court to promote truly cooperative labor/
management relations while continuing to invalidate those programs not freely
chosen by employees and those controlling the right of employees to organize.
VI. CONCLUSION

Unless the Supreme Court provides the lower federal courts and the Board
with clear guidelines to evaluate the legality of Japanese-style worker participation plans, the resolution of § 8(a)(2) unfair labor practice charges will continue
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ACr, 1947, at 56 (1948) (emphasis in the original).

114. The Conference Report states:
Section 8(d)(3) of the [House version of the bill] provided that nothing in the act was to be
construed as prohibiting an employer from forming or maintaining a committee of employees
and discussing with it matters of mutual interest, if the employees did not have a bargaining
representative. This provision is omitted from the conference agreement since the act by its
terms permits individual employees and groups of employees to meet with the employer and
section 9(a) of the conference agreement permits employers to answer their grievances.
H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., ist Sess. 45 (1947), reprintedin I LEois. HIsT. LMRA, supra note
113, at 549. Contra NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 217 (1959) (Supreme Court used the
mere rejection of § 8(d)(3) to support its holding that employee committees are dominated "labor
organizations") (emphasis added).
115. "[Japan's] trade surplus is going to be reduced more by direct investment [abroad] than it is by
change in their domestic market anyway." Powell, supra note 1, at 43 (quoting Edward Lincoln of the
Brookings Institution). In 1986, the estimated U.S. trade deficit with Japan was $60 billion. Id. at 42.
116. Nearly 250,000 Americans now work for Japanese companies in the U.S., making Japan one
of the largest and fastest-growing employers in the United States. Id. at 42.
117. See Krause, supra note 70, at 46.
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to depend on jurisdiction. In several strict standard circuits, the possibility of
successfully defending a § 8(a)(2) charge brought against a worker participation
program is slim. Even in the more liberal circuits that emphasize employee free
choice, employers do not enjoy carte blanche to initiate any program they desire.
Without legislative revision, the NLRA does impose, in every circuit, certain
restrictions upon Japanese-style worker participation techniques.
Until the legal status of worker participation programs is clarified, employers
in the United States will be hesitant to initiate such programs. The Supreme
Court should adopt a combination of the dealing/communicating distinction and
the actual domination standard. This hybrid approach will allow the Court to
support freely chosen participation programs that contribute to cooperation between labor and management without resulting in a judicial revision of the
NLRA.

